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Summary 
There is an undercurrent of opinion in Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) administration that 
the village corporation structure established under the Act is an anachronism, unsuitable to the needs of 
modern corporate enterprise and accordingly Alaska Native purposes. This line of criticism suggests 
that the regional corporate structure, also established under the Settlement Act, is sufficient to the needs 
of the Alaska Native people. Organizational issues in the Settlement Act are both politically and 
emotionally sensitive. As a result, discussion of this point of view has been muted. It is nonetheless 
important. The purpose of this paper is to search out the purposes of village corporation existence as a 
foundation to change or for a better understanding of the roles that are played by them. The Act serves 
as a written constitution for the Alaska Native people. It must be interpreted broadly to accomplish 
these fundamental purposes of the people and not as an instrument of a particular economic theory – 
which is, at least in part, alien to its heritage. 
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Introductions 
There is an undercurrent of opinion in Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act administration that the village corporation structure 
established under the Act is an anachronism, unsuitable to the needss 
of modern corporate enterprise and accordingly Alaska Native purposes.s 
This line of criticism suggests that the regional corporate structure,s 
also established under the Settlement Act, is sufficient to the needss 
of the Alaska Native people.s 
Organizational issues in the Settlement Act are both politically 
and emotionally sensitive. As a result, discussion of this point ofs
view has been muted. It is nonetheless important. The purpose ofs
this paper is to search out the purposes of village corporation 
existence as a foundation to change or for a better understandings
of the roles that are played by them.s
The focus of the critique of village corporate existence iss
economic. It is pointed out that village corporations are economically 
inefficient, particularly in comparison with regional corporations.s
It is largely on this premise that some have suggested that the 
village corporation structure be drastically altered through merger 
into the regional corporation, by managerial neglect followed bys
bankruptcy on a natural selection basis or by some other strategy. 
While this may well be ultimate destiny for some village corpor­
ations, or even most of them, such fundamental changes should not bes
intentionally initiated or allowed to happen without clear understand­
ing of the ends which are contemplated would be served by village 
corporations under the Settlement Act. 
The corporate structure of the Settlement Act was a means to 
a more fundamental end: The long term welfare of the Alaska Native 
people. The particulars of this purpose, which are implied rather 
than expressed in the Act, tend to get lost behind the more mundane 
and recognizable purposes of corporate business management and the 
administrative directions of the Act. The distinction between ends 
and means in the Act is blurred: Corporate benefit is too easily 
equated with benefit to the Native people. Nevertheless, long term 
ends are implicit in the Act and can be identified. An exploration 
of the function of the village corporation should include a review 
not only of the core 0£ statutory and common law legal obligations 
of the Settlement Act and of corporate law but also a search for the 
long term purposes which village corporate life was intended to serve. 
If those long term purposes were improvidently framed in the Settle­
ment Act, or do not now reflect mainstream purposes of the Alaska 
Native people, then a new policy should be articulated reflecting 
more accurately the central concerns of the Alaska Native people. 
Such a policy should employ a strategy to minimize economic and 
human harm if the village structure is fated to be liquidated. On 
the other hand, if village corporate purposes as originally conceived 
are still valid and have a central meaning to Alaska Native purposes, 
then a different strategy involving revaluation of means and guide­
lines is called for, so those purposes can be better conserved. Such 
a strategy might work around the structure of this Settlement Act or 
call for its amendment. But purpose would determine technique, not 
visa versa. 
Drift is unacceptable. The issues must be brought into the 
open. No discussion means low levels of participation. Every person 
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sharing in the heritage of the Alaska Native people is affected 
and beyond that person for generations. Self-determination requires 
information for effective participation in formulation of the common 
destiny. 
Against the background of the goals of the people, a number of 
options for the future of village corporations should be evaluated. 
The Settlement Act did not envision a fragmentation of efforts in 
reaching these goals but an institutional structure allowing diver­
sity bound to overall purpose by a web of cooperative agreements. 
In weighing the options for the future of the village corporation, 
the extent to which valid objections to the village structure may be 
met or ameliorated by implementation of village to village coopera­
tive efforts should be considered. The Act serves as a written 
constitution for the Alaska Native people. It must be interpreted 
broadly to accomplish these fundamental purposes of the people and not 
as an instrument of a particular economic theory - which is, at 
least in part, alien to its heritage. 
Finding the Purposes of Village Cor_eorations 
The settlement statute contains no clear statement why village 
corporations were created. Purpose is to be assumed from assigned 
powers, from functions and from the historical and cultural back­
ground against which the Act was adopted. Although the statute 
recites certain obligations and restrictions upon corporate activity, 
which will be dealt with in later pages, it does not really explain 
what purposes were to be addressed by the village corporation. This 
omission arose in part from proper deference to the belief that 
principles of self-determination required that each village corpora-
tion be allowed to write its own destiny. Nevertheless some 
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implications of Congressional purpose in corporate purpose are 
inherent in the fact that they were set up at all. Why didn't the 
authors of the Act vest all land interests in the regional corpor­
ations? Why did they add, to the existing involvement of share­
holder interest in regional corporate structures, yet another 
universe of corporate complexity? Surely the inefficiency of over 
two hundred units must have been apparent even then. The establish­
ment of means implies ends. 
In responding to this inquiry, only brief reference will be 
made to the "demon'' theory of Settlement Act history. According to 
a line of argument, following the path of at least intellectual 
resistance, any time there is something in the Act which someone 
doesn't like, any time there is something in the Act that is in­
efficient or which doesn't seem to work very well, it is because the 
enemies of the Alaska Native people put it there with malice in 
their hearts. 
There are doubtless many inconsistencies, usages, practices, 
requirements and structures which, if everyone were starting over 
again, would be done differently. These results from the falibility 
of any document drawn by man and not from malice or the political 
shenanigans of the non-Native world. 
Outside the Alaska Native community the basic political opposi­
tion to the Act was quantitative. Opposition to the Settlement Act 
did not focus ons.what was done with the resources identified in it 
but on how much land should be given and how much money. For better 
or worse the organizational structure reflects the well intentioned 
purposes of those who had a hand in the drafting and principally 
the handiwork of the Native leadership and their attorneys. 
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Nevertheless, (as further developed in the section of this 
paper on the historical setting of the Settlement Act) there is 
one questionable purpose intrinsic to the Settlement Act which is 
easy to overlook as a purpose. That function or purpose is to 
make the Alaska Native think prirna�ily as an acquisitive, economic 
person. Not everyone who supported adoption of the Act was aware 
of this consequence. Many might seriously question whether this 
effect was not an unwarranted intrusion on cultural autonomy. In 
many ways this economic mandate is th� core of the controversy 
over village corporation existence. 
Representation as a Purpose 
Critics of the village corporation structure of the Act rely 
heavily on the economic inefficiency of village corporate organiza­
tion. Yet there is evidence that representative purposes were 
uppermost in the minds of the Act's authors and that economic 
efficiency, as a value, was purposefully given a back seat to repre­
sentation. The discussion and defeat of the "one big corporation" 
idea offers ample evidence of the crucial nature of representational 
issues in the minds of the Act's authors. For if twelve regional 
corporations are more ef£icient than 200 plus village corporations, 
so one or two statewide corporations are more efficient, at least 
in the world of corporate competition, than twelve regional corpor­
ations. 
The control of resources carries with it prevailing power. The 
authors of the Act recognized that in establishing a structure for 
the disbursement of economic benefits they were also laying the 
foundation for the political and socio-economic structures of a 
radically transformed society. Few federal acts are more triumphantly 
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capitalistic in their approach to the responsibilities of government. 
A society which neither collectively nor through any of its members 
had every known substantial economic wealth was endowed under the 
Settlement Act with the reality of it for the former and the proba­
bility of it for the latter. 
The Settlement Act was intended to be a settlement with a people, 
not with individuals, not even with this generation of Alaska Natives 
but a settlement for all time in which the first generation of leader­
ship holds awesome responsibilities. Individuals rights were recog­
nized and satisfied only with regard to specific claims of occupancy. 
Since occupancy is recognized without regard to Native or non-Native 
origins of the occupant, this provision of the Act is more of a 
settlement of settlers' claims than a Native claims settlement. The 
entire settlement was delivered to Alaska Natives as capital endow­
ment for a people. The issue of who would control that endowment by 
what means was answered through the provisions for corporate organi­
zation. The repr�sentation model was taken from the business corpora­
tion. 
Corporate Democracy as a Representative System 
You don't have to own shares in General Motors to realize that 
corporate democracy is not as democratic as political democracy. To 
paraphrase: "Corporate democracy is to democracy as martial music 
is to music.s'' While some corporations, in whicih controlling stock 
is held by one family, sometimes act eccentricly and in response to 
the will of individual shareholders, most large corporations are 
broadly held and predictable in their conduct. The individual share­
holder has little voice in corporate direction. The management 
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reigns supreme. Alaska's broadly held regional corporations.bear 
the greatest similarity to the large corporation model. 
For all its failings, democratic government is at least designed 
to maximize control by and accountability to its shareholders, the 
people. Corporate democracy is more concerned with economic effic­
iency even at the expense of control and accountability. The limit­
ations on the effectiveness of representation are not a fatal defect 
in an organization the purposes of which are narrow and well under­
stood: to make money. The shareholders in an American business 
corporation are likely to be satisfied without exception so long as 
that purpose is well served. Only very occasionally is a corporation 
required to address social issues; trading with South Africa for 
instance. Though the purposes and values of individuals are varied 
and include non-economic objectives, the management structure of a 
corporation, particularly a business corporation, is designed to 
allow judgement almost exclusively on the financial performance of 
the corporation. The corporate structure is not comfortable with 
social issues since fiscal accountability is the only built-in 
structure for measuring corporate performance. 
But as an organizational framework for an institution which was 
intended not only to pursue larger purposes but which serves as the 
basic structure of a social order, the traditional business corporate 
organization is a troublesome device. It bestows no favor on the 
Alaska Native people to substitute, for the benign colonialism of the 
federal government, corporate serfdom . 
Not only does the modern business corporation tend to be socially 
deaf but it is only marginally representative. Executive control of 
American corporate management is largely self-perpetuating. The 
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circle of management in a widely held corporation is not one in 
which voice is given to dissent or the presentation of conflicting 
views. Those who first attain corporate authority very largely 
control the means of access to information and the possibility of 
change. Only in the case of corporate economic collapse, do the 
managers of corporate enterprise have much to fear from the wrath of 
their owners. Money, ·or the loss of it, is one thing people can get 
together on. 
With the best of intentions, there is little likelihood, at 
least in the long run, that Alaska Native corporations will operate 
much differently, at least not without basic changes in corporate 
design that have as yet shown no signs of emerging. A continuing 
review of the suitability of the business corporate law to the pur­
poses of the Alaska Native people may suggest some adjustments. 
The Village Corporation As A Grass Roots System of Representation 
While each American business corporation tends to be internally 
monolithic there is considerable diversity among them. The free 
enterprise system is founded on the proposition that such diversity 
and. competitive struggle among the corporations will, in the long 
run, result in the greatest benefit to all the people. Thus, the 
creation of hundreds of smaller corporations through the Settlement 
Act created the possibility of expression of much more diversity of 
opinion, purpose and value. The village corporation, by virtue of 
size and geographic proximity, is closer to the people it represents 
and is inherently a more representative body than the regional 
corporation. Each individual in the smaller corporation must count 
for more and the village corporation, as a result, will be more 
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responsive to the wishes of individual citizen shareholders. 
The village corporations by their diversity, are also the 
nursery for development of leadership for larger communities of 
interest and form the organizational foundation from which leaders 
of dissent or alternative viewpoint can go on to challenge the 
premises of conduct of the larger 6rganizations of the leadership 
itself. It is no wonder then that some regional leadership might 
view the withering away of the village structure with equanimity. 
It is considerably easier to conduct any enterprise with harmony 
and without enlarging the possibilities for expression of opposing 
or alternative views. The existence of harmony between villages 
and regional corporations in any given situation today should not 
be allowed to obscure the diversity of village development as a 
hazard to regional hegemony and an opportunity to insurgents. 
The village corporation cannot escape the long history of the 
village and its complexities of purpose. The regional corporation 
has almost no heritage. The regional corporation also has a more 
clearly expressed economic mandate - to manage the subsurface estate 
for maximum yield, to oversee the economic ventures of the villages 
of its region and to provide centralized expertise in economic affairs. 
It is no wonder then that regional officers tend to view village 
organization through the eyes of economic purpose - and they are 
frequently appalled. Seeing few possibilities for economic redemp­
tion for such inefficient and necessarily (economically) poorly 
managed enterprises, some might rather see the experiment in village 
corporate organization, which also constitutes a drain on regional 
resources, collapsed as soon as possible. 
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The effect of merging villages into regions may be to reduce 
conflict between villages and regions but where that conflict has a 
real base, the point of difference will remain, though suppressed. 
The expression of dissent, of differences of opinion, is at the 
heart of the democratic process. The existence of many separate 
organizations within the ANCSA corporate structure introduces a 
method of expressing diversity and dissent which is not present in 
normal corporate life. By this mechanism perhaps a greater degree of 
democracy can be introduced into the undemocratic tendencies in forms 
of corporate enterprise applied to the Native people of Alaska. 
Can A Village Corporation Be Dissolved? 
Most of the discussion which suggests redesigning Settlement 
administration to eliminate or pare down village corporation structure 
has been based on the assumption that a village corporation is no 
different from any other kind of corporation and should be dissolved, 
merged or otherwise manipulated, responsible only to the domestic 
Alaskan law of corporations. 
While this proposition may be true, it is yet to be tested in 
court and there are some aspects of the Act which could lead to a 
contrary interpretation. Though the corporations of ANCSA are formed 
through voluntary associations of individuals, once the Act is 
engaged (or at least once land is received) it may be that it is 
impossible to let go. 
Though the roll of the settlement is closed, the Congress did 
have in mind that that Settlement Act was a settlement on a people, 
not just on individuals. Some of the present holders of interests 
under the Settlement Act, hold under a trust to later generations. 
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The pattern of later generation control will reflect unequal in­
heritance of stock and differentiated access to corporate opportun­
ities. But control does not fully equate with beneficial interest. 
The corporations of the Settlement Act, while not government 
instrumentalities in the usual sense, are the instruments of a 
trust by which the Congress intended to carry out its constitutional 
responsibilities to the Native people of Alaska, a responsibility 
which does not attach only to one generation or one roll. 
Under Section 7(b) of the Act, as it was adopted, certain mergers 
of regional corporations were permitted expressly but only within a 
certain period of time. By implication, regional corporations may 
not merge at all at any time after the one year period. Merger does 
not result in a loss of assets or even eliminate representation, 
but it does terminate a unit of representation in whose separate 
identity the government {as precursor trustee), and the trust bene­
ficiaries may have a strong interest. The implication is strong 
that no regional corporation has a right established under the Act 
to dissolve itself, at least as a deliberate act, while still holding 
assets or bound under a trust obligation to its villages. 
The original statutory provisions relating to the establishment 
of village corporations made no reference to me+ger or dissolution 
whatsoever. The implication is there that the Congress originally 
did not intend that a village dissolve or merge at all. 
In keeping with concerns regarding the economic viability of 
smaller villages, regional leaders importuned the Congress to adopt 
merger provisions and a section 30 was added to the Settlement Act 
by the Act of January 2, 1976 (Pub.sL. No. 94-204, 86, 89 Stat. 1148)s. 
The statute effectively confirms the inability of regional 
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corporations to merge among themselves and prohibits a village 
corporation from merging outside of its own region. 
Interestingly enough, the Congress did show some regard for 
a permanent village life. Even in merger, a separate entity must 
spring to life under Subsection (3) of the amendment to take the 
right of consent to mineral exploration within the village, a 
very significant economic power. The new entity consists not of 
the shareholders of the merged village corporation but of Native 
residents, a further recognition of the dual nature of the Settle­
ment Act as a settlement with individuals and with a people. 
Economic Merger Through CooJ?E-Fative Agreements 
It may prove to be desirable to merge numbers of small village 
corporations under the 1976 law. But mergers in any case should be 
approached cautiously having in mind the advantages of the potential 
for independent action by any village. Non-corporate merger for 
most purposes can be accompanied through cooperative agreements be­
tween villages which allow the "merger" to be tailored exactly 
to the needs of the situation. If merger is founded on economic 
efficiency, care should be taken to preserve distinct representational 
values. Merger of management responsibilities may well be possible 
without infringing on separate representative identities. 
Cooperative agreements can merge the funds of villages for 
investment purposes, provide for joint control over certain assets 
and separate control of others. Cooperative agreement can achieve 
each benefit of merger in law separately, while leaving representa­
tional or other purposes of village corporation existence intact. 
Cooperative agreement can still leave room for independent action 
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by villages when needed and even leave open the possibility of 
withdrawal. Mergers under corporate law are difficult, often 
practically impossible to undo. 
Mergers of village corporations are difficult to effect. The 
merger authority, particularly the authority to merge a village 
into a regio�al corporation, leaves unresolved how the pattern of 
distributions and management checks and balances reflect in other 
sections of the Act would be carried out. Mergers that do take 
place will likely remain open to collateral attack by subsequent 
shareholders or village residents who can claim that the trust respon­
sibilities originally imposed on the village corporation are not 
being carried out by the successor. The merged village may remain 
an undigestible rock in the stomach of the regional corporation. 
If through mismanagement, or by intentional design, a village 
corporation went bankrupt, the trust responsibilities and represent­
ational rights survive. Nor was the federal constitutional respon­
sibility discharged. In the most probable event that a corporation 
went bankrupt still holding significant assets in landed estates in 
the vicinity of the village, it would seem unlikely that the 
Secretary could avoid entering a federal bankruptcy proceeding £or 
the purpose of husbanding those assets and reasserting the federal 
responsibility for a trust to Native people in the absence of a 
responsible corporation. One might anticipate that some responsi­
bility would be recognized to trace assets diverted and to recover 
them as possible through overturning transactions or setting aside 
transfers, and tracing management irresponsibilities to corporate 
directors and those who had dealt with them. 
The implication of Settlement Act purpose in the existence of 
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each village corporation and in the persistence of that existence 
has serious implications for regional corporations and their 
corporate management. For if a village fails economically, injured 
parties are likely to look around for a goat. The implication of 
a trust relationship in which the region bears some responsibility 
for the conduct of village affairs and the presence of regional 
assets make the regional corporation itself an inviting target. 
The alleged mismanagers of regional corporate responsibility to 
villages are a likely secondary target. Corporations and individuals 
in them that do business with village corporations should also be 
mindful that today's modest overreach of a shaky village may come 
back to haunt through a variety of imaginative theories seeking to 
undo the damage - and then some. To date, regional corporations have 
been loath to intervene in village economic decisions, though clearly 
given the power to do so, for fear of taking on responsibility for 
the consequences. But it may evolve that they are damned if they 
do and damned if they don't. 
The Trust Responsibilities Ef ANCSA Village Corporations 
The existence of a number of obligations of village corporations 
can be drawn from specific provisions of law. While each provision 
has its special function, it is likely that courts construing these 
provisions together may imply broader purposes and responsibilities: 
First, the existence of a trust responsibility in the village 
corporation is suggested by Section 3(j), a trust which may well 
involve substantitive duties. A "village corporation " means an 
Alaska corporation organized to hold, invest, manage and/or distribute 
lands, property, funds and other rights and assets "for and on behalf 
of " a "Native village" in accordance with the terms of the Act. 
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 A trust relationship seems to be referred to, obliging the Alaskas
corporation to follow the federal purposes on behalf of an unincor­
porated and possible unorganized entity, the "Native village". 
Responsibilities are suggested here, for a number of purposes, which 
go well beyond the ordinary purposes of business corporations, obli­
gated to respond only to their shareholders. 
Distributions From Reg�onal Corporations Under Section 7 (j) As 
A Source of Perpetual Village Authority 
Section 7 (j) provides that for five years "45%" then, ' not less 
than 50%", of "all corporate funds" received by regional corporations 
from: (first)s, the Alaska Native Fund; (second)s, under Section 7(j) 
(which means a piece of both the 70% shared with other corporations 
and the 30% retained by the home region corporation)s; and (third)s, 
all other net income of the home regional corporation "shall be 
distributed to village corporations. " Since distribution to share­
holders of regional corporations are described on the same b�sis, 
we may conclude that village corporations stand on a similar footing 
as regional corporation shareholders in their right to distribution. 
In a sense, the village corporation is a non-voting shareholder in 
the regional corporation. The law of corporations relating to the 
rights of shareholders of non-voting shares may be a potent source 
of analogy for village rights. 
From the perspective of Congressional intent, the fact that 
"not less than 50%" is to be distributed after five years is inter­
esting from two perspectives. First, why start at the lower horizon 
of "not less than 45%"? Evidently the Congress contemplated that 
the regions would be burdened with extra costs or disbursements 
during the early years and that the share of the villages could 
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reasonably be expected to go up rather than down as those initial 
costs or disbursements were satisfied. What are those initial costs? 
Most obvious are the pass through disbursements to individuals. But 
there are also costs involving village assistance. Another range 
of costs are derived from resource management supervision which is 
also high in the initial stage. If costs associated with village 
responsibilities are direct burdens of the regional corporation as 
the shifting percentile seems to suggest, the Congress must have 
contemplated that the regional corporation was the servant of village 
needs, and not that the village was a kind of administrative unit sub­
ject to regional corporate control. 
Secondly, the Congress evidently foresaw that the village, 
through their shareholders, would ask for and should be allowed to 
get a higher proportion of distributable assets. Significantly, 
apart from the minimum required to go directly to the shareholders or 
the inherent requirements of management of regional statutory respon­
sibilities, no maximum is put on the extent of village distribution. 
The possibility was evidently contemplated that the regional corpora­
tion might become a management shell only, and that the basic authority 
for management of distributable assets would be with the villages. 
Thirdly, one might ask if an increase of the village share was 
in the offing, who was to move that increase? Regional corporation 
shareholders have the legal authority, but such an eventuality is 
unlikely unless villages serve as collectivities for the expression 
of regional shareholder interest. Thus the act appeared to contem­
plate that even without direct voting rights, village corporate inter­
est would be heard through village organization of regional corporation 
shareholders associated with the village. 
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Those who contemplate, with satisfaction or relief, the 
withering away of village corporations through bankruptcy might 
well keep in mind the potential of the flexible, 7 (i) 7 (j)s, distri-
bution formula. If a lot of villages get in trouble, particularly 
if lack of regional corporation care can be identified as the source 
of the problem, even if only through neglect, the village corporations 
will constitute a potent political force to expand their share of 
regional corporation receipts to make up these losses. 
The ihftentification of a legislative perception of the villages 
as. the fundamental settlement unit is of course a surprising turnabout 
of the more current suggestion that the villages should disappear in 
favor of the region. Why the Congress might have proceeded on an 
assumption, apparently so out of tune with the emerging reality of 
the late seventies, will emerge further as we examine the origins 
of the village and regional corporation concepts of the Act. 
The Administration of the Village Share in Alaska Native Fund 
Receipts As a Source of Perpetual Village Authority 
The Settlement Act provided that anywhere from 45% to 100% 
(presumably a share reduced by the costs of keeping the regional 
corporation alive to perform its representational and distributive 
functions) of the funds appropriated by Congress or contributed by 
the state to the Alaska Native Fund will be distributed to village 
corporations. This provision gives each village corporation a 
stake in accurate and full federal and state conformity with contrib­
utory obligations, a stake in efficient regional corporation manage­
ment of receipts and a stake in equitable arrangements for pass 
through. Conceivably, village corporations could make collective 
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arrangements for determining whether 45% was the appropriate pass 
through or whether the amount should be raised. While the village 
corporation has no direct vote on the issue, it doBS have the legal 
capacity to educate and organize its shareholders through corporate 
action for forceful influence on the regional corporation. 
Significantly, there are no obligations on village corporations 
to pass through any of their cash receipts. This is wholly in keep­
ing with the collective and capitalist nature of the congressional 
settlement. The central purpose of the Settlement Act was not to 
endow individual Natives with benefits but to create a continuing 
capital stake in the economy of the state and the country in the 
Native people as a whole. The congressional sponsors of the Act 
were deeply concerned that, in the past, individual assets had been 
squandered through lack of a collective responsibility.  But more 
importantly, Congress was concerned that distributions to individuals 
had been too small in prior settlements to be used for other than 
consumer purposes. The Act was designed with the basic intent of 
creating centers of capital formation and growth. The possibility 
that the assets might be passed through largely to individuals was 
viewed with disfavor by congressional leaders. The ten percent 
required distribution by regional corporations was by way of throwing 
a bone to individuals who might otherwise wait a long time to see 
beneficial results and who, without the bone, might organize to 
raid corporate treasures. 
Administration of the Village Share in 7 (i) Distributions As A 
Source of Perpet�_a_l Village Authority and Inter-Village Con£ lict 
Section 7 (i) receipts are the funds constituting the return from 
the 70% of revenue in subsurface estate and timber rights which each 
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regional corporation is required to share with all regions. As 
of this writing, the U. S. District Court for the District of 
Alaska has ruled on a formula for calculating these distributions. 
Appeal to the Ninth Circuit is pending. As with Alaska Native Fund 
receipts, the first level of village corporation concern with 7(i) 
receipts is in the fair calculation of their amount and in scrutiny 
of regional corporation performance in protecting the village's 
interest in those receipts. From 45 to 100 percent of 7(i) receipts 
will accrue to the village corporation through 7(j) sharing. 
The interplay between the right to a proportionate share of 
70% of the receipts of other corporations from subsurface and timber 
estates and the obligation to part with 70% of the receipts from 
one's own regional corporation is complex and has been receiving 
extensive treatment elsewhere. What should be noted here is the 
potential of 7(i) questions for raising sharp differences of interest 
among village corporations depending upon, among other things, 
attitudes toward development, the geographic proximity to a particu­
lar village, natural endorsement in wealth required to be shared 
under 7(i), the extent to which that wealth is intertwined with 
surface estate values which are retained by the village alone and 
the influence of the final system of 7(i) accounting on village 
interest. This system will determine whether 7(i) distributions 
are maximized to meet the overall intent of the act in democratiza­
tion of distribution benefits or minimized to meet the natural 
inclinations of ' haves " and the ideological objectives of a land 
oriented settlement. Enhancement of village interest tends to avoid 
7(i) distributive effects. If potential regional corporation profits 
are siphoned off through maximized payment for village-owned surface 
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estate interests, less is distributed through the 7(i) formula. 
However, if this condition prevails generally, most villages will 
be trading away bigger long term benefits in 7(i) distributions 
for less valuable, short term benefits. 
Apart from 7(i) differences relating to whether the village 
considers itself to be a "have" or "have not", other interests will 
distinguish village opinion which need careful evaluation for each 
village in determining upon whom that village can more effectively 
cooperate. 
The village which is strongly oriented to traditional values, 
for instance, and which opposes "growth " because of its influence 
on lifestyle, and which is not located in close proximity to 
resources will be inclined to an expansive view of 7(i) sharing 
which will bring it money at no cost to the local environment. 
If it is located in an exceptionally wealthy region, however, 
there may be more cash in enhancing the 30% retained share, pro­
vided the village can stop development on its own land. 
The combinations influencing each village's interest are 
legion. The general point to be drawn is that there is no necessary 
coincidence of interest either with the region in which the village 
is located or with any other particular village in the region, and 
automatic cooperation with either on 7(i) issues may work to a 
village corporation's disadvantage. Each village must first deter­
mine its own interest and then look for others of a like mind 
whether in or out of the region. 
The method by which a regional corporation computes or attempts 
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to enhance the 30% retained revenues1 is first likely to be of 
even greater importance to a village within the same region. 
If a region is successful in enhancing 30% values through an arrange­
ment (e.g. high payment for surface values, employment or austens­
ibly necessary public works) which passes that value to a village 
located in proximity to the asset, other villages in the same region 
(unless they can cash in on similar arrangements) will suffer more 
than other regions because, mathematically their proportionate share 
of the 30% is likely to be much higher than their share in the 70%. 
It is difficult to see how these different shades of interest 
in asset distribution and corporate activity could be protected in 
merger arrangements that resulted in disappearance of the village as 
a representational entity. Yet they are entitled to be recognized 
under the Act. 
Administration of the Village Share in "All Other" Regional�o_r:e_oration 
as a Perpet:ual._Obl_iqatiori of Village_ Corporate Existences.s
"All other" income will consist principally of investment income, 
interest income and income incidental to programmatic activities. The 
most obvious village corporation interest is first in the determina­
tion of whether these amounts are being fairly and accurately computed. 
However, more important from a policy perspective is whether regions 
should be encouraged to produce this income and in what ways. The 
central issue, which may already have been substantially prejudiced 
by events, is whether the villages view the regional corporation as 
1/ 7(i) funds are properly referred to as the 70% portion required
to be shared among the regions. Section 7(i), though, technically
refers to both the 70% and the 30% retained in which the village
also has a very large.interest. We follow the popular reference, 
calling the 30% 7 (j) funds. 
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the proper body to conduct activities designed to produce ' other income.s" 
"Other income " sounds like something of an afterthought in the statute -
just in case there was some. However, if village corporations decline 
to seek exercise of their right to substantially all of the distribut­
able income of the regional corporation·then "other income" will loom 
increasingly large. Other income (assuming the retained portion of 
subsurface income is considered 7(i) income) is principally the income 
from investment or interest in retained funds. There are many good 
reasons to utilize the regional corporate structure for investment. 
What is important is to remember that the villages have a say - perhaps 
the final say in the matter if they chose to exercise it through 
shareholder organization. The role of the region can be confirmed 
either by expanding dividend policy or by increasing the pass through 
to the villages. The expansion of regional corporate enterprise is 
by sufferance of the villages, �ilhen there is a consensus of the vil­
lages, not by right of the region. 
Such expansion should serve the common village purposes. The vil-
lage's review process on "other. income" should involve the determination 
whether and to what extent the villages chose to have the regional 
corporations serve as the nucleus of capital investment. 
Considerable attention has been focused on the right or duty of 
the regional corporation to review village corporation activity -
through its ability to require a plan, budget review, etc. In a sense, 
focusing on these review provisions tends to distort the real under­
lying framework of accountability and representation provided for in 
the act. These specific review provisions are few and narrow. · On 
the other hand, the obligations of the region to account to the villages 
are as extensive as the villages wish to demand, collectively, through 
their shareholders, and are inherent in the concept of the village as 
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the fundamental unit of representation and the region as trustee to 
the interests of the village. 
The regions have so outspaced village corporations in scale 
of ac tivity that it is hard now to visualize the village corpora­
tion as the fundamental unit of representation and control. Never­
thelesss, there are good reasons to recognize a strong authority 
in the villages arising from historical circumstances present when 
the Settlement Act was £ormed. This historic village primacy casts, 
incidentally, a special light of interpretation on the provisions 
of the Settlement Act providing for regional corporation overview 
of village corporation activity. Regional corporate review must 
not seem to prefer a regional corporate interest over a village 
interests. 
Before going on to review the statutory rights and obligations 
of the regions , to review vi llage activity in the setting of village 
cooperative agreements, and the larger issues of the purposes of 
village and regional corporate organization, it might be well to 
review the historic context of organization of Alaska Native people, 
a context against �hich the Congress established the unique corpor­
ate structure of the Settlement Act. An appreciation of this back­
ground is necessary to understand what Congress was thinking about 
when it provided for these corporations and the division of respon­
sibility it envisioned among them. 
Organizational Purposes Arising from Hist�r�c Setting of the 
Settlement : The Pre-Settlement Evolution of Village and Regional 
Organization 
In the beginning there was the village. The unique patterns 
of fundamental social organization of Alaska Natives had presented 
a problem to the officers of the United States government long 
-23-
before organizational forms were being reviewed for implementa-
tion of an Alaska Native Claims Settlement. Alaska escaped the 
series of l egislative " solutions" to Indian questions of the 
preceding century not only because of the territorys' s  isolation 
but because the Indian bureau was accustomed and federal legisla­
tion was shaped to deal with "tribes " .  The possibility that tribal 
structure might not be the fundamental unit of aboriginal social 
organization missed not only later generations of Congressmen, but 
also the founding fathers who wrote in the Constitution that the 
Congress "shall have the power . . .  to regulate commerce . . .  with 
the Indian tribes.s" 
National information programs or services were commonly 
organized for delivery considering a tribal structure. At least 
partly as a result, (fortunately for the Native inhabitants as it 
turned out)s, the Al askans never got the word when legislation 
was adopted extinguishing Indian rights. In the absence of infor­
mation, the fundamental unfairness of extinguishment caught the 
attention of the American public and paved the way for adoption of 
the Settlement Act. 
Whatever the views of the federal government, the village 
remained the fundamental unit of Alaska Native life. The village 
was the culture carrier. It was the hub from which the meaning of 
Alaska Native life radiated. It was and is the heart of the Alaska 
Native identitys. 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act sprung from two or 
three quite different, psychologically based, ideological sources. 
The Alaskan Native demanded protection of his land and way of lif e .  
The land and way of life were increasingly threatened b y  invasion 
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from the south, an invasion incited by the recognition 0£ the 
wealth of the Alaska land , wealth defined in the cash terms of 
American society . The economic ripening of Alaskan oil made that 
threat precipitous. The developmental segment of American society 
wanted to clear the way for that resource development. A social 
engineering segment saw economic self-sufficiency as a social sol­
ution to the pervasive poverty in which almost all Alaskan Natives 
liveds. 
Though the Native people got largely what they wanted in the 
Act, the terms upon which the settlement was made are those of 
the larger American culture. This is not a matter £or angry re­
joinder. The framework was unavoidable. The Settlement was not 
first written in Yupik or any other Alaska Native tongue. It does 
not carry the values of the Alaskan languages but of English. It 
was not forged by a village or a council of village leaders upon 
the application of petitioners from the government of the United 
States but visa versas. 
For the most part, those who represented the Alaska Native 
position in the forging of the Settlement Act were men and women 
who had bridged the gulf between the Alaskan Native and English 
viewpoints. This is no reflection on the patriotic loyalty with 
which they represented the Alaskan Native point of view. Rather 
it enabled them to find points 0£ accomodation for the principal 
objsectives and value systems of developers, of social engineers 
and the Native interests in the arena of settlements. It is no 
accident that the leader of the Native movement in the crucial 
time was a man who had already made his way as an entrepreneur 
in the Alaska commercial world as a construction contractor. 
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Long before the precise framework for the settlement was 
envisioned, the Native leadership recognized that only larger 
forms of organization would serve as vehicles for representation 
in dealing with the Congress. The Congress was too preoccupied 
to deal  with the individual claims of hundreds of villages. The 
weary course of the Tlingit-Haida settlement and other judicially 
defined settlements demonstrated the procedural inadequacy of 
judicial settlement and the hazards of claims based narrowly on 
specific evidence of occupation by recognized groups . Besides 
the dangers in allowing the federal government to mediate differ­
ence of opinion among too many segments of Native interest were 
obvious. 
Still, one Native organization would not suffice. Though 
there were no tribes among the northern Indians, there were 
still articulated communities of interest based on geography 
and geography-based ethnic family ties. These newly formed and, 
£or the most part, unprecedented regional Native organizations 
were large enough for the federal government to deal with. They 
looked enough like tribes to elicit the recognition of the larger 
American societys. They worked. They attracted the young leader­
ship more sophisticated in the ways of bureaucratic organization. 
Power arises when someone else recognizes it. The Alaska Native 
village had not been recognized as the fundamental unit it really 
2was; the Alaska Natives formed regional "tribes" which were.s
2/ As usual, any generalization about the Alas�a Native experience 
can be misleading. Alaska Natives are not one people except as 
they are being defined so by the larger culture which finds it 
particularly useful to lump people together based on skin color 
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This new shaping of Native organization was highly adaptive 
to the political situation and began immediately to work its 
effect on the form of settlement itself. 
While much of this recent history is obvious, even self­
evident, to the adult generation of Native leadership, it is well 
worth reciting for the benefit of the young, the forgetful or 
the general readers. The regional organization, supported by the 
cash flow generated by the Settlement Act and the Congressionally 
created legal power over villages was so adaptive that it is now 
the dominant form of Alaska Native organization, to the point 
where its hegemony is supported by newly framed " customs" as well 
as Congressional enactment. 
Functional Differentiation Between Village apd_sRegional 
Corporations 
The significance of  this history lies in the differences 
between region and village in value orientation and purpose, in 
right to be heard as the authentic voice of the people. These 
differences are reflected in many provisions of the Settlement 
Act. 
The regional corporation is well suited to meet the develop-
mental interest in economic enterprises. It is large enough to 
support the bureaucratic organization indispensible to large scale 
or prior arrival. The Indians of Southeast Alaska and the Interior 
are more tribal in configuration than Eskimos, but lack the strong 
central structure of plains Indians. The Bureau of Indian Affairs 
attempted fitfully in earlier years to organize natives into 
villages under the Wheeler-Howard Acts. Particularly in Southeast 
Alaska these organizations sometimes worked well and formed a 
basis for business enterprise. 
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economic activity. It is cash oriented. Its assets are exclu-
sively cash-related, generated from the cash settlement and the 
subsurface estate - an interest in real property which has mean­
ing only for its cash equivalent or economic developments. The 
real land , the land of the Native people is the surface estate, 
land held by vi llage corporationss. 
The regional corporation is large enough to form a vehicle 
for the delivery of social services and to provide a n  economic 
unit from the perspective of those who want to see the Native 
people get a permanent economic stake in society. Regional cor­
porations are wealthy enough to be centers of capital formation, 
to engage in risk takings. Most villages quite conspicuously s hould 
not engage in risk taking . Their as sets are so s mall that the 
establishment of a single enterpri se would absorb a dispropor­
tionate amount of as setss. Risk taking is intended for enterpr i ses 
large enough to absorb the total los s  of one enterprise as a 
tolerable proportion of investments in many. Most villages are 
too small to support alone the bureaucracy of management, the 
technical staff experti se in resource or enterprise management 
needed for evaluation or the fiscal management staff required to 
assure accountability . If the average village is to engage in 
this type of activity - entrepreneurship, it must do so in some 
quite different form - through participation with others - whether 
villagess, regional corporationss, independent corporate enterprises, 
cooperative organizations or whatever other forms are suggested, 
not through the standard form of ANCSA village corporations.  
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The Special Responsibility of the V_:i._llage Corporation - A Historic 
Settin2_ 
Since the village corporation is so clearly set up in a way 
guaranteed to fall short of the optimum objectives of economic 
enterprise in the usual sense, what are the objectives of the 
village corporation? 
Just as that government is best which is closest to the 
people, so it is true that the form of Native organization which 
is closest to the people is best. The village corporation is 
representative. The municipal corporations which, as was forseen, 
are likely to rise in many villages are not as well adapted to 
the Native purposes because the basis of "ownership'' in a munici­
pal corporation is residence. With at least historic justifications, 
Alaska Native people are suspicious of municipal corporations as 
institutions easily dominated by an aggressive outsider. While 
the dangers of capture of village corporations by non-Natives 
through the acquisition of ownership are likely exaggerated (and 
the risks of capture by less scrupulous Alaska Natives or by non­
Natives of Native corporate management underestimated) nonetheless, 
the unalienability of its shares, for the present, makes the village 
corporation specially suitable for carrying the cultural heritage 
associated with the village. This was the historic role of the 
village before the Act. It should be continued. 
Though the regional corporations are defined in ways which 
seem to establish them as more powerful under the settlement - the 
right to review plans and budgets of villages, etc.s, the larger 
reality casts them rather as trustees of the wealth generated by 
the settlements. They are responsible to the villages and the 
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peoples, not the other way arounds. This is reflected in the way 
a regional review authority is stated in the Act and in the 
emphasis on cooperative agreements among villages in the Act. 
The analogy is similar to the federation of the states of the 
United States in the United States. In the original model, the 
states are sovereignties of unlimited general government powerss; 
the federal government exercises the necessary refereeing function 
in a federal system and otherwise such powers only as are permitted 
by the states. The village corporation is the first representa­
tive of the original interests of the people in land, in the 
heritage. 
The very lack of financial and managerial capacity gives the 
village a special perspective on the purpose and value of any 
activity taking place in Alaskas� The regions, whose bank accounts, 
real or potential, are the central reason for their being , will 
tend to have a more dollar-oriented perspective. The villages 
will act as a moderattng influence on this regional view. 
In practice, there is a tendency for the opposite flow of 
influence to occur. Village corporate leadership, unsure of 
objectives, looks to the region for advice. The advice given, 
while generally sound, is usually enterprise-oriented. The risk 
of serious and undesirable loss under such circumstances is great. 
What then is the proper economic role for the village corpor­
ation? How, if at all, is it different from the regional corpora­
tion except in size? Village corporations are poorly situated to 
act as investment companies. Regional corporations, through their 
greater aggregations of capital wealth, can spread risk, retain 
expert fiscal control and management. If villages are going to 
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act in this sphere, the sphere of money making enterprise for 
the sake of profit, they should do so only through cooperative 
agreement so that their resources are pooled and risk and cost 
of management spread so that each village bears only a small 
proportion of these overhead costss_ The Congress appreciated 
this, which is why cooperative agreements are selected out for 
specific reference while so many other subjects are ignored. 
Cooperative agreements are the crucial £actor which will make 
the village system work. 
It is undesirable for regional and village corporations, 
acting collectively or otherwise, to compete against each other 
to mutual disadvantage. Vigorous competitive activity among 
business corporations may make for a strong American economy. 
It is not at all clear that competition among ANCSA corporations 
has a beneficial relationship to any public good or Alaska Native 
interest. 
A philosophy must be developed concerning the separate spheres 
of action of the regional and village corporations as a guideline 
in principal to corporate activity. The ANSCA corporations should 
avoid the kind of trouble for instance that confuses Alaska local 
government. In Alaska, a borough and a city are governments of equal 
potential though having different names and accordingly conflict and 
compete among each other until they are merged togethers. 
The Act may provide some hints as to the possible economic 
and other roles of village corporations, particularly with its 
cooperative agreements section. The basic purpose of village cor­
porations is to support the values of village lifes. This may 
include the promotion of local industry operating within the 
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confines of a circle of villagess, but the principal purpose of 
economic promotional activity should be to create desirable jobs 
for the villagers and to enhance the quality of village life not 
to create economic activity for its own sake or for the sake of 
profit. The village corporation should answer the questions: 
What would you do to make the village a better place if only you 
had the money to spend? The region, on the other hand, is the 
proper manager of capital investments. If villages have a surplus 
of funds, not necessary to meet the needs of village purpose, they 
should enter into cooperative agreements with regions or other 
villages for the investment of such funds on a larger scales. 
When a village corporation identifies a potential profit­
making enterprise based within the confines of the village, its 
own resources should go only to the equity portions, or a share only 
in the debt. The region should act in the role of banker (or 
find a banker) so that the whole resources of the village corpora­
tion are not jeopardized. 
If a proposed new business is a reasonable risk, venture 
capital can be secured through the regional corporation or other 
outside resourcess. A requirement of a debt base to financing makes 
it much more likely that adequate fiscal scrutiny will be observed. 
But the key to village corporation purpose is not economic 
but non-economic valuess. The regional corporation is a poor carrier 
for the civilization of the Native people though it may provide a 
financial bulwark. The village corporation is the successor to 
the village corporation established under the Indian Reorganiza­
tion Act (IRA) as a form by which village people can meet the out­
side worlds. One student of the Act has suggested that village 
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corporations should consider continued utilization- of IRA corpor­
ation forms as a method of avoiding the alienation of stock which 
will start to occur at the end of the twenty year period of statu­
tory inalienability and a technique for keeping state taxing 
authorities at bays. While the evaluation of this specific mechanism 
is beyond the scope of this article , it demonstrates the proper 
spirit in responding to the Settlement Act. 
Settlement Act stock is inalienable only for a limited times. 
Provision for expiration of alienation reflects two other hidden pur­
poses of the Act : termination and integration. Should these obj ec­
tives be recognized and accepted? If not, what strategies can be 
developed to utilize still the benefits of the act but divert these 
aspects of the Settlement Acts' s  social and political determinism? By 
the same token, recognition must be given to the determinism of the 
Act in forcing or encouraging its beneficiaries into the mode of 
acquisitive economic thought. Maybe this mode is desirable. It may 
be the currency of survival. But these effects should be weighed 
and if they are not in keeping with basic traditions, strategies 
should be developed to escape the Act's straight-jacket on the minds 
of Alaska Native people. 
The Village as the Trust Enforcer 
A primary objective of the village in approaching the dollar 
aspects of the settlement should be the protection, enhancement 
and accurate and forceful representation of the shareholders in the 
regional corporation of the villages' s  region. 
This occurs now in a haphazard way through the widespread use 
of proxies. At meetings of regional corporations, most shareholders 
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from a village are usually represented by one or more proxy holders, 
in effect representatives of the villages. The procedures whereby 
these representatives are selected should be carefully examined to 
assure that a system guaranteeing accurate representation is assured. 
Is the individual  who successfully promotes the most signatures for 
himsel f  the right representative for the village? Or should the 
village council select a proxy holder and encourage members of the 
village to give their proxies to that person? 
What methods are established to assure continuing accounta­
bility of the proxy holder for all the issues that might come before 
the meeting? What method is followed to assure that the proxy 
holder is fully informed on the wishes of the shareholders? How 
might issues of differences of opinion among shareholders be resolved 
by the proxy holder? 
One technique for articulating and resolving differences 
among shareholders and which makes sure the maximum weight of the 
village is preserved is the voting trust. Through a voting trust, 
a member of the trust agrees to be bound by a majority in the trust. 
This assures that a group sentiment is expressed in voting in the 
larger corporation regardless of individual views. While a voting 
trust submerges individual opinion, it does give great weight to 
a collective viewpoint - e. g .  that of the village - . and, if imple­
mented with adequate meetings of its members, gives a greater 
guarantee of effective representation than a proxy alone. The 
village corporation can administer a voting trust made up of stock 
of village shareholders in the stock of the regional corporation. 
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The Responsibility of the Village� !-�o Plans, Budget and Audits; 
the Responsibility of the Regional Corporation to HeJ..p 
The preceding discussion emphasizes that the village not the 
region, was the more fundamental unit of Native organization and 
the concept of village representations, accordingly, was deeply 
rooted in the formation of the Settlement Acts. The region was a 
service unit and referee to village interests not the other way 
arounds. The village was perceived as the fundamental unit of 
popular responsibility and power. 
Yet some terms of the Act sometimes seem to turn this around. 
Section 7 (1 )  and 8 ( b )  vest certain review powers in the regional 
corporation over the village while at the same time inferentially 
imposing some procedural requirements on village organization. Each 
village must establish a village plan . Each village must set an 
annual budaet. Each vi l laae � must conduct an� annual audits. 
The ingredients of program planning and budgeting, so dear 
to government, have been imposed on villages by indirection, 
through statutory description of regional corporation powers and 
responsibilities in these areas. 
The Act's directions to regional corporations are sketchy: 
The regional corporation ' ' may" withhold funds until a village cor­
poration submits a ' satisfactory" plan. As Professor Price has 
indicated3 the use of "may" in reference to withholding funds 
against a "satisfactory plans'' indicates that withholding may be too 
drastic a remedy for a particular fault. But surely it would be 
3/ Price "Regional Village Relations Under ANCSA" - UCLA, Alaska 
Law Review. 
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dereliction of regional corporation duty not to require and if 
necessary assist the village in the process of preparing a 
formal plans. While the region has limited authority over the 
substance of a plan, the absence of a village plan meeting pre­
scribed procedural requirements puts the region broadly in jeopardy 
for anything going wrong in the village that could be traced to 
the absence of a plan. 
The only expressed substantive standard for village plans 
in the Act is suggested by the grant of specific authority for 
the region to require joint venturess, generally, with other villages, 
and for joint ventures with the region, particularly, that will 
benefit the regional areas. What this contemplates in practice is 
that the region has the responsibility to review any major village 
proposal to meet a village need to see if it is something that 
should be done cooperatively .s .A procedure for dispute resolution 
is obligatory . While the term "arbitration " is used, no particular 
form of arbitration is provided for. Thus any form which the 
village has agreed to in advance is suitable. "Arbitration" suggests 
only a consensual agreements. 
Why, out of all the dozens if not hundreds of dispute potentials 
under the Settlement Act was this one picked out for a special 
arbitration procedure? Because the system of organization of the 
Act requires a workable, agreed to method of resolving disputes. 
The arbitration procession, in a sense, asks the Native corporations 
to establish a "supreme court" or courts for each region or for 
the whole to resolve disputes arising among them, as an anology 
to the Supreme Court role as arbitration to the federal 
system of the United States. The Congress saw that cooperative 
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agreement, not litigations, was the answer to this kind of issue -
not j ust a dispute resolution but the advancement of the interests 
of all parties. 
Annual budgets "shall" be subj ect to "review and approval" . s
Something going beyond "submission " of a " satisfactory" plan is 
required when it comes to budgeting. The regional corporation 
" shall assist and advise Native villages in preparation of articles 
of incorporation and other documents necessary to meet the require­
ments of this sub-section.s" Budget documents are "other documents 
necessary.s" Accordingly, assistance in preparing budgets is man­
datory on the regional corporation. 
The plan is, of course, less subject to regional guidance 
because the substance of a plan is peculiarly the right and respon­
sibility of the village. Only where that plan involves the possi­
bility of conflict with overall regional programs or where village 
plans may be in conflict does the region appear to have a clear, 
substantive authority. 
The most prominent feature of these provisions is the burden 
they place on the region to establish a procedure for its action 
in relation to village corporations. The region is given the 
power, in part the duty, to review plans. As we have indicated, 
as a practical matter, a duty is imposed to require at least that a 
plan be prepared, in form, insofar as otherwise all misfortunes 
attributable to the absence of a plan are likely to be laid at the 
region's doorstep. The region must at least establish a procedure 
and standards for determining whether the discretion to review is exer­
cised. Some kind of plan must be available to allow the region 
to exercise this preliminary judgement. Guidelines for what 
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constitutes a "satisfactory' '  plan must be established if the region 
is to narrow the range of its guarantee of village solvency. Most 
beneficially and with maximum protection for the region, guidelines 
should be established on a consensual basis with the villages. 
The relationship between the region and the villages and the 
direction to be taken by the region might best be visualized in 
the context of the Congress ' s  concerns regarding village economic 
immaturity. The region is seen as performing the tasks 0£ guidance 
and standard setting until each village is on its £eet. 
Thus the basic standard by which the region can consider 
reducing its responsibility is the extent to which the village has 
demonstrated its capability for independences. The degree 0£ over-
sight should depend upon some measure of how economically sophis-
ticated the village is or has become. For instance , the extent of 
review of plans and budgets could  depend upon whether the village 
has successfully prepared such plans and budgets in preceding yearss. 
The question is really : "Is this village ready to go it alone?s" 
The courts may well apply a standard of negligence to a relation­
ship in which the regional corporation is seen in the role of 
guardian to the economic welfare 0£ the village. The question iss: 
"Would a reasonable regional corporation, considering what it knew 
or should have known about the economic maturity 0£ this village, 
have allowed it to proceed with the level of supervision or over­
sight it actually received? "  
When something goes wrong, the burden is likely to be on the 
region, with its superior resources, to prove that what it did or 
did not do was reasonable under the circumstances. The best way 
-38-
£or a regional corporation to build up a "reasonableness'' standard 
against which its own behavior in particular cases is to be judged 
is to articulate what "reasonableness" is through rules and guide-
lines arrived at on a consensual basis. Of course this imposes 
costs on a regional corporation. But obj ection to this cost is 
not pertinent since these are not ordinary business corporations. 
They are the instrwnents of settlement and the dividend to the 
shareholder is not the only guide to successful performance. Some 
attorneys and managers seem inclined to give a very rigid concept 
of regional corporation authority focusing on conventional fiscal 
obligations to shareholders. This is an erroneous and may be an 
ultimately financially disasterous interpretation. 
The statute gives the regional corporation the j ob of writing 
the law on the subj ect of requirements for budget and planning , 
having in mind its responsibility to assure the financial security 
of the village corporation. 
The reasons for giving the region author ity to review budgets 
are not hard to come by . There was widespread concern that unsoph­
isticated villages would waste their assets, particularly during 
the early years. The Congress decided to establish a five year 
"learning period" for village corporations, during which more inten­
sive regional corporation surveillance would be required. But the 
purpose of this provision was to protect the villages from their 
own improvidence, not to invest the region with sweeping power to 
control the course of village purpose nor to impose control over 
the long term obj ectives of the p lan along with sound managements. 
Required Cooperative Agreements 
The authority of the region to require a plan to provide for 
joint financing with other villages and with the regional corporation 
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is a power to referee potential sources of conflict. The emphasis 
is on potential. The authority lies to encourage cooperation. The 
power to require joint participation is not unlimited but must also 
be exercised reasonably. Reasonableness does not just mean the 
regional corporation has a good idea for spending money. Unless there 
is a reason for cooperative undertaking as,sldistinguished from indi­
vidual undertaking, there is no authority to require participation. 
Some regional refereeing role in economic planning is a neces­
sity otherwise the villages could spend their entire wealth on destruc­
tive competition. Every village, for instance, cannot start a fish 
processing plant for a larger areas. Some economic enterprises 
clearly call for organization on a scale beyond the village. It is 
cheaper to run a consumers cooperative serving six villages than ones. 
Who decides what village takes the leadership? The region is to call 
the shots on such enterprise in the interest of maximum efficiency. 
The regional corporation need not always be caught in the middle 
on these kinds of arrangements. Some kinds of enterprises very 
small scale service enterprises depending 'for their economic vitality 
only on the servicing of single villages, such as a general store, 
can make it alone. The region would have no authority in such. a case 
to require joint venturing. 
The joint venturing provisions arise from the recognition that 
village economic self-sufficiency is the exceptional case. Most 
rural enterprises depend for their survival on successful inter­
dependence - usually a market consisting of more than one villages. 
If two villages both propose to embark upon enterprises in circum­
stances where the economy of the area will only allow one to survive, 
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the region has a duty to intercede. 
In the delivery of many goods and services it is difficult 
to say that one village has a clear right over another to engage 
in that businesss. Nor is it desirable to allow one village to 
get in a position of economic power over another. Accordingly, 
the region may require that the villages share, through joint 
venturing or joint financing, in the building of an enterprise. 
A common example would be the construction of a fish proces-
sing plant. Clearly the catch from many villages would be neces-
sary to make the plant work. But should one village gets'sall the 
benefit and have all the control over the processing, so important 
to all the villages? Such circumstances seem to require participa­
tion in the management of the enterprise of all villages affected. 
In some circumstances it may be more e f ficient, particularly if 
the scope of the enterprise is large and all villages in the region 
are affecteds, to have the regional corporation itself conduct 
the enterprise. For instance, the development of a transportation 
and wholesale marketing business requires a larger scale of organ­
ization for the purchas� of airplanes, warehousing and expert 
staff, that might well work best with more than one region cooper­
ating to cover dozens of villages. No village is in a position to 
undertake such an enterprise alone. If it were, is it fair to allow 
that one village to exploit the others? Through joint venturing, 
each village can express itself to the extent of its interest. 
The regional role as trustee and arbitrator of a federal 
system requires the regional corporation to do not less than analyze 
all village plans to determine how they fit together and to referee 
potential conflicts. The arbitration is more likely to involve 
the region establishing an arbitration between two villages than 
an arbitration of village-regional differencess. 
The duty of the regional corporation to stop a village 
from undertaking an improvident enterprise arises under its budget 
review authority and not its planning review authority. Budget 
review is not subj ect to arbitration and the duty of the region to 
exercise veto over a clearly improvident investment will not be 
easily avoided. 
For instance, a village plan might include a program for 
village economic self-sufficiency through the development of a 
sawmill. The plan is subject to review and should be subject to 
review because the proposal is interconnected with the regional 
corporation interest in timber. Other villages may be involved 
because their surface estate rights are af fected and the labor 
of the people of the village engaged. A careful balancing and 
packaging of these interests is required in the financial and 
management arrangements made. If agreement is not easily resolved, 
some arbitration may be required. The region must impose it. 
Arbitration might be before an economic court or a general Alaska 
Native court of contractual design previously agreed to between the 
villages and the regions for settling these matters. 
Continuing the example as part of its budget, the village 
includes expenditures for capital investment in the sawmills. The 
regional corporation reviews the budget. It reasonably requires, 
by its regulations, that all budgetary items requiring an investment 
of over 15% of the annual income of the village (or over a certain 
dollar limit) be accompanied by or followed by a prosforma investment 
analysis. The region must then say, after looking at the invest-
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ment analysis, (if it is true) "I am sorrys. The sawmill you propose 
is not economically viable. It will go bankrupt. The region dis­
approves.s" This authority is not subject to arbitration as a 
requirement of the Act. It is possible that the region, in review-
ing budgets, may set up a review process for the benefit of the 
parties .  But it is not required and the form of review would be 
purely a matter of choice for the regional corporation or, on the 
regions' s  option, agreement among the parties. There is nothing 
to stop the parties from adding more requirements to their joint 
administrative arrangements if they believe it is desirable. 
The Duty to Exchange Information 
There are significant additional implications in the require­
ments of review and arbitration concerning the power and duty of 
the region to gather and disseminate information concerning 
village economic activity and to report on its own economic activity. 
The region is obliged to act as a clearinghouse for information 
respecting economic plans to assure the whole works smoothly. If 
its own plans run at significant variance to village interest, fail­
ure to fully disclose may be a trap. The region is caught in an 
uncomfortable conflict of interest between its own profit making 
practices and its trust responsibilities to its villages. Under 
such circumstances, open book operations are the only safe answer. 
For instance, the region would probably be liable for damages 
if it allowed two villages to develop prosjects which would end up 
in destructive competition. The regional corporation would itself 
be liable if it proceeded on its own to develop a pro ject which 
resulted in economic loss to a village. The region would be liable 
if it sponsored a village cooperative arrangement among one group 
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of villages which worked to the detriment of another. 
There are natural tendencies for each corporate unit, whether 
village or region, to proceed with a good deal of secrecy. Once an 
island of legitimate security is established there is a tendency 
for it to spread. "National security" secrecy encourages federal 
officials , when in doubt (_o r when in fear of embar:rrassment) to stamp 
it confidential. The same happens in private enterprise. There is 
a legitimate zone of "business secrets,s" which, if revealed, will cause 
financial loss to the corporation. From this springs the attitude, 
"when in doubt, keep it close to your chest.s" This has the effect 
of limiting the flow of information of mutual benefit. 
The Congress was interested in seeing the whole system work to­
gether . Accordingly, within each region, substantial information 
sharing is required under section 7 Ci}  (j) (1 ) (m) , 8 (.b)s, 14 (_c) ( 5 )  
and those advantages which are protected by secrecy must be subj ect 
to regulations. 
Though. in a particular case one village may benefit from infor­
mation sharing, in the long run it is destructive to adopt a wholesale 
secrecy policy in which one village tries to get ahead of another or 
the region ahead of eithers. Good development ideas must be shared 
and financing and management shared when other Settlement Act bene-
ficiaries have a stake in the success of the enterprise . 
•.•. • ·. -.. ··· · -•,..t·· 
An additional benefit of this approach is that risks of 
failure, which inevitably accompany any new enterprise, will be 
spread over many villages or the village and the regions. Thus no 
village will end up with all its eggs in one basket. 
Voluntary Cooperative Agreements 
The previous paragraphs covered j oint agreements that might 
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be imposed as a matter of regionally diagnosed economic desirability 
or to avoid conflictss, joint agreements which are mandated by the 
Act. However, there are few limitations on the pow�r of village 
corporations to voluntarily develop cooperative arrangements with 
either other villages, the region or third parties to enhance any 
perce ived interes t. 
First among these agreements, in point of obviousness, is 
the desirability - even the necessity of entering into cooperative 
arrangements for the performance of basic accounting responsibili­
ties. Village responsibilities can be handled more cheaply with 
many participants in such matters as setting up and managing books 
and accounts, budgets, stock records, the performance of audits, 
the development and maintenance of land records, the development 
of associated training programs and similar tasks. Few villages 
can do it on their own without spending much more than they can 
afford . An accounting firm might charge $2, 000 to perform some 
of these tasks for one village, $1,s000 for each of eight villages 
and $750 for each of thirty, - and do a better job each time the 
number of its clients increases. Compatibility of accounts will 
make for better accountability and enhance the possibilities for 
cooperation among villagess. 
In these matters, a village should seek organization agree-
ment and determine its needs first and then seek out the services 
required, rather than responding to a proposal by a private entre­
preneur. When the entrepreneur initiates the plan, promotional 
costs are high and the competitive factor in keeping cost down is 
lost also. Additionally, if a village responds rather than 
initiating action, the village is not forced to figure out for itself 
exactly what it wants and how much it can pay. Goals get fuzzy 
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and the purposes of the village and purposes of the contractor can 
get confused. The setting of internal management goals and compara­
tive shopping for services are very beneficial to the villages, 
both in cost reduction and in gaining business exper ience. 
Before discussing purposes and methods of cooperative agree­
ments for conducting enterprise, it would be well to comment on 
the nature of the village plan and the kind of purpose that might 
be expressed in it. 
As soon as village corporations are about to get some money 
they are besieged by proposals for what to do with it - buy this or 
that, hire this person or anothers, invest in this enterprise or 
another. But before making any choices among the options urged 
on it by individuals, each concerned with his own benefit, each 
village must decide collectively what it wants to dos. Does the 
village want to set up and own enterprise? Does it want to bankroll 
others in setting up ventures? Does it want to put in a dock or 
water system? What does it want to do? Setting long term purposes 
is the village corporation's most essential activity. 
Village Purpose and Investment Policy 
The village should be careful to distinguish between the 
purposes for its existence and the care 0£ its assets, its invest­
ment policy. A good investment policy £or a village corporation 
is passive. The village corporation is not a money making machine. 
Its investment policies should follow the cash needs of its "purpose" 
policies. The principal responsibility of a village corporation is 
to look out £or the village - to make improvements in t he village 
which everyone can benefit from to establish enterprise in the 
village which will be economically self-sufficient and which will 
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provide satisfying and reasonably paying employment to its residents , 
to improve the quality of life of the people in the village in what­
ever manner seems sensible and appropriate to the people. It is 
unlikely that every village will be confident that the first plan 
it develops is the right one. It may be that for many, maybe 
most , the best policy will be to put money away for a time until 
a good use can be settled on . 
But putting money away, investing money, is not the purpose 
of village corporation activitys. Investment policy should be the 
servant of purpose. It serves no village purpose, for instance, 
to buy property in Anchorages. Purchasing of such property, though, 
might be a part of investment policy, the policy which determines 
what you do with the money until you need it. 
The management of investment is a specialized profession. 
There are strong reasons why investment should be handled through 
cooperative agreement either with the region or other villages or 
both. The establishment of a bank by several regional corporations 
will be helpful in assisting villages with wise investment manage­
ment policy. 
There are substantial costs associated with investment 
management. The larger the sums of money invested, the smaller 
the proportion which is necessary to spend for managements. In 
managing money market instruments - time deposits, government 
bonds, etc.s, which earn interest but can be quickly turned into 
cash when needed, efficiency and profitability requires investment 
on the scale of tens of millions of dollars. That suggests a 
very large cooperative agreement with many, many corporations 
involved. Some kinds of investments, like money market investments, 
are very low risk, provide low earnings but are easily  reduced to 
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cash when cash is needed for something really important. Other 
investments like the investment in purchase of a building is not 
very "liquid' '  since it can be sold most profitably on ly when there 
is a willing buyer, which seldom happens just when the owner 
wants to sel l. This kind of investment is long term and must be 
very carefully considered since the money will not be available 
eas i ly for purposes closer to real village interests. A good 
investment pol icy calls for a "balanced portfol io" - some higher 
r isk, some lower risk and spread out over different enterprises 
or activities, but bearing first in mind the possibil ities that 
cash may be needed promptly for something really important. 
Cooperative Organization for Business 
A single village managing its own investment is l ikely to 
end up with an unbalanced portfolio - all of its assets tied up 
in a very small number of investments . Local ventures, l ike most 
small businesses just starting, are very high risk. Nationally, 
the majority of new small businesses end in failure. There is no 
reason to suppose that Alaska village corporation sponsored businesses 
will do an awfully lot better. Rather than each vi llage investing 
in one business, which wil l  result in some villages losing al l 
their investment and some being very successful, it might be better 
to pool assets through a small business investment company owned by 
many vi l lages or through a bank or other arrangement so that there 
will be a common pool of expert supervision over the investments, 
standards for profitability, and the risk of fai lure will  be spread 
so the danger of any one village going under wi l l  decrease and the 
possibil ities of all doing better will increase. 
When a single vi llage underwrites an enterprise for its own 
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area , there is a possibility that its failure will be disguised 
through additional cash injections or hidden subsidy . Why does a 
village want an industry in the village if the industry must always 
get new loans , with little hope of repayment to survive, if  the 
peopie of the village must work long hours for low wages to make 
it work , i f  it brings in a lot of people from outside the village 
who disrupt village li£e? The business may technically show a small 
profits, yet from a village perspectives, it is a failures. 
A great many uses of money, even the usual case, will involve 
mixed questions of investment and purpose policys. A village industry, 
it is hoped, is a good, profitable and safe investment of village 
money. It is also hoped that it will make the people of the village 
happier . Care is necessary in keeping account of these two obj ec­
tivess: happiness or well being on the one hand and profits on the 
other , keeping them accounted for separately . From considering these 
obj ectives distinctly but together, the village will be strengtheneds. 
Considerable caution should be exercised in buying out a local 
business as an objective of corporate social policy . An investment 
which just results in the substitution of Settlement Act invest­
ment for investment by others may not involve a real benefit to 
the village . On a larger scale, if the Settlement Act simply buys 
out existing investment in rural Alaska, perhaps a new, more 
desirable set of landlords results but control is purchased at the 
expense of much of the financial benefit of the Acts. If the business 
is badly run , however , or is small and it could be made into a bigger 
or more profitable business , the investment may be worthwhile. 
Cooperative Organization for Purposeful Activity 
Besides investments, purpose-directed corporate activity can 
also be accomplished more economically through cooperative endeavor . 
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Purchase and transportation costs in support of any good project 
are almost always less if the scale is larger. Building 100 meet­
ing houses under one contract is cheaper than building each of 
ten separately. 
Coop�rative Organi�ation for Market Strength 
.Many vi llages are being approached by companies who want to 
invest in natural resources protected by the village through owner­
ship of the surface estate. Such a company can go to one village 
and then another saying "If you don ' t  give us just what we want, 
we will go to the other village instead and you will lose the bene­
fits we are promising.s" This is called "whipsawing.s" There are 
strong advantages to villages cooperating and exchanging informa­
tion on natural resource and land policy and problems so that they 
won ' t  be whipsawed. 
In the ordinary life of business corporations, secrecy is  
the rule. That is because the usual corporation is locked in compe­
tition with other corporations. The tendency in village and regional 
corporations is very strongly this way, to keep secrets because 
they may be in competition with each other. But the Settlement 
Act will not work if the corporations spend their resources in 
destructive competition and.smiss opportunities through failure tos
share information. In the larger world of commerce, it is beneficial 
to the economy of the country to encourage competition. Agreements 
to restrict competition may be unlawful under the anti-trust laws 
but it will depend upon the circumstances. The Settlement Act is 
a special case. The advice of a lawyer is necessary in setting 
up arrangements which may seem to have the effect of restricting 
competitions. 
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The Selection 0£ Partners 
The selection of associates in a venture and the k ind of 
agreement that should be entered into depend on many factors. 
Depending on the kinds of objectives sought, the associates should 
bes: 
1.s F..n independent entreprenuer or businessman -
or group of them. 
2.s A bank or financial institution - or a groups
of them . 
3.s Another village or a group of them.s
4.  The regional corporation or one or more neigh-
boring regions. 
5 .  An existing non-profit corporation. 
6 . s A municipal corporation - or several of them. 
7 . s The state or a federal agency - or several 
of them. 
If the activity is not necessarily to be profit-making, one 
of the latter on the list may well be preferable. If the purposes 
are those sometimes associated with government, tax free govern­
mental structures may be better and may provide access to free 
grants or low interest money. Water, sewer and docking £acilities, 
for instance, are in this category. 
The fact that something is good to do does not mean that the 
village corporation is the best entity to do it. The v illage may 
wish to urge someone else to do what it would like to see done or 
assist and support someone else. The basic questions are the degree 
of control which may be desirable or necessary iri the v illage 
interest and the incentive necessary to get others interested in 
- 51-
the desired goal. The degrees of control needed will depend 
upon how closely allied the interests of the associating parties 
ares. 
Other village corporations make good associates because 
there is already so much common interest. But cooperating villages 
are also sharing weaknesses such as management inexperience so 
other associates may well be needed to compensate for village weak­
nesses. 
Cooperative agreements are not all good. If the activity is 
on a small enough scale to be accomplished without too large an 
investment of village assets, the advantages of cooperation must 
be weighed against the loss of control, the result of shared 
control and costs of communication. 
A Cooperative Exchange 
But going it alone should be the exceptions. There is a need 
for a place of exchange where villages seeking associates or advice 
to help in common endeavors can come for further assistance. To 
the extent that regional corporations maintain active village 
assistance programs, the region is a good organization to support 
such activity. As we have indicateds, through its obligation to 
provide guidance and information exchange systems, the regions 
may well decide to initiate a cooperative exchange with some degree 
of formality. The strength of the regions' s  own interest in such 
affairs may warrant a separate forum for village corporation ex­
change, even crossing regional boundaries. For many purposes 
villages from different regions may have more in common with each 
other than they do with their respective regions. 
-52-
Cooperative Policy Compacts 
Forms of agreement have purposes well beyond combination 
for economic activity. Some agreements, particularly those 
having to do with resource management, may be simply binding agree­
ments to pursue common policies or exchange information. Villages 
could agree, for instance ,  to a set of common and coordinated 
policies on land or ownership sales, providing for notice or 
consultation before any sale is made so villages will not compete 
against each other driving the price down, and provide for common 
systems of land disposal and management. Villages could enter 
into agreements involving mutual promises not to sell or dispose 
of certain land without joint agreement so that the conservation 
policies of one village are not undercut by a developmental policy 
of a neighbor .  
Whipsawing tactics o f  major companies could be defeated by 
compacts calling for the exchange of information among villages. 
After all , when the Ajax Oil Company negotiates separately with 
villages A, Bsand C, it knows exactly what goes on in each nego­
tiation. Why should village A only know what goes on in its own 
negotiation and not know what goes on in conversations between 
Ajax and village B or village C? That ignorance is a source of 
strength to Ajax with its knowledge of all negotiations. 
Conclusion 
The first rush of administratives.senthusiasm following the 
adoption of the Settlement Act with its hundreds of corporate 
structures has focused on rationalizing it along the lines of 
purpose of commercial corporations. This movement has been helpful 
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in identifying economic weaknesses in the Settlement Act structure 
and in identifying economic strength as an objective of Settlement 
Act organization. But economic efficiency is not a goal of over-
all Alaska Native purpose but merely an instrument of larger purposes, 
purposes which finds their grass roots expression in village life. 
Many o f  the purposes of economic efficiency can be promoted through 
cooperative arrangements among villages or between villages and 
other entities without destroying the villages' s  corporate identity, 
a result of mergers. Indeed cooperative arrangements, promoted and 
refereed by the regional corporation, are mandated by the Act. 
Corporate competitiveness within Settlement Act structures is not in 
the best interest of the Alaska Native people. The Act envisions 
a cooperative system of endeavor aimed at human goals. The profit­
making mandates of corporate life must not be allowed to dominate 
the lives of the peoples, but must be transformed to serve contem­
porary adaptations of traditional Alaska Native points of view and 
lifestyles. 
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